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Der Bericht beschreibt ein im Rahmen des Projektes Spaltstoffflußkontrolle
im Auftrag der IAEA entwickeltes Überwachungssystem für D20-Reaktoren ähnlich
dem in Atucha t Argentinien.
Nach einer Analyse der Reaktoranlage und des Weges der Brennelemente inner-
halb der Anlage wird die logische Struktur des Überwachungssystems dargestellt.
Die wesentlichen Maßnahmen sind: Kennzeichnung von Brennelementen t Versiegelungs-
maßnahmen t die das unbemerkte Auswechseln oder Entnehmen einzelner Brennstäbe
aus elnem Brennelement verhindern t Überprüfung der Bewegung der Brennelemente
innerhalb der Anlage sowie Überwachung des Strahlungspegels in Reaktornähe.
Außerdem wurden der Aufsichtsbehörde in regelmäßigen Zeitabschnitten die inte-
grierte Reaktorleistung und die Betriebszeit des Reaktors mitgeteilt.
Der Bericht beschreibt t welche Instrumente und Maßnahmen nötig sind, um das
vorgeschlagene Überwachungssystem zu verwirklichen, er macht außerdem Angaben
über den Ablauf eines typischen Inspektionsbesuches. Schließlich wird eine
Kostenschätzung gegeben t und es werden Vorschläge für eine praktische Erprobung
des Systems gemacht.
This report describes a safeguards system for D20 moderated power reactors
of the type presently built in Atucha, Argentina. This work has been done
for the IAEA within the frame of the Karlsruhe safeguards project.
After an analysis of the layout of the Atucha Reactor, the logical structure
of the proposed safeguards measures has been evolved. The basic measures are:
marking of fuel element subassemblies, sealing measures to prevent that single
fuel pins can either be replaced by others or be removed without breaking the
seal, checking the movement of the subassembly handling mechaniisms along the fuel
routes, and monitoring the radiation level in the reactor bay area. Besides
tfiis, tne inspection organisation will receive inforinationon in'tegratea power
generated, and shutdown history of the reactor at regular intervals.
The report describes the instruments,accessories and actions required to
implement these measures. It also describes a typical inspection visit to the
Atucha reactor, presents an estimate of the cost involved, and ends with a pro-
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Development of Safeguards Procedures for
Heavy Water Moderated, Cooled and Reflected
Pressurised Water Type Reactors.
1. Summary
The present report describes the final results of investigations. carried out
at the Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik. Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe.
during the period of the contract 7ll/RB, on the development of safeguards
procedures for heavy water reactors similar to "Atucha".
After an analysis of the layout of the Atucha Reactor, the logical structure
of the proposed safeguards measures has been evolved. The basic measures are
a) confirmation of the final routes as g~ven by the operator, b) sealing.
identification and checking the integrity of the fuel subassemblies, c) check-
ing the movement of the subassembly moving mechanisms along the fuel routes
and d) monitoring the radiation level in the reactor bay area. Besides this,
the inspection organisation will receive information on integrated power
generated, and shutdown history of the reactor at regular intervals.
The report describes the instrument, accessories and actions required to imple-
ment these measures. It describes a typical inspection visit to the Atucha





Tbe rapid expansion of the nuclear industry in the world today. tends to
indicate that a large numberof power reactors will be installed in a large
number of countries in the next few years. According to arecent study by
the lAEA {-1_7. more than 280 power reactors are expected to be installed in
21 countries 1975. On account of economic reasons. the number of power reactors
may be 10-20 times more than that of the fuel cycle facilities (reprocessing.
fabrication and conversion plants) required to support them. Because of the
large number. the safeguards system for power reactors should be simple without
reducing its effectiveness and economic to ease the burden on the safeguards
authority. The commercial nature of the power stations requires that the safe-
guards system should be non-intrusive and should not hamper the normal operation
of the plant.
Although the present trend of power reactor installations indicate that the
major part would be of the light water. enriched uranium type. heavy water.
natural uranium type reactors are also expected to play an important role.
particularly because of the fact that such reactors are independent of enriched
uranium requirement.
The present report deals mainly with the development of safeguards proeedures
for the"Atucha" reactor. This is a heavy water moderated. natural uranium type
power reactor. designed by the firm Siemens A.G•• Germany. The reactor has
been supplied to Argentina. It is being erected at Atucha. Argentina and is
expected to go into operation in 1972.
/-1 7 Power and Research Reactors in Member States.
lAEA publication (1968)
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3. Survey of Safeguards Requirements
3.1 General Requirements of the Safeguards System
The type of instruments and the associated methods of evaluation as
weIl as the location of the strategic points have to be selected as
1. to resultin sufficient and reliable information, so that the
Agency can effectively safeguard the flow of source and special
materials
2. to avoid any interference with efficient plant operation.
3.2 Requirements for Reactors
In a reprocessing plant as weIl as in a fabrication plant, the flow of
fissile material can be safeguarded by comparing the measured input with the
measured output for each nuclide of interest. This may have to be supplemented
by information concerning the process inventory of each individual nuclide.
This principle is difficult to fulfill in reactors, as because of nuclear
reactions transformations of nuclides will take place. There are two possible
ways to circumvent this difficulty:
1 By means of a combination of input measurements and calculations, a
nominal value for the output of each nuclide to be safeguarded will be
established. A measurement of the output(for example, in a reprocessing
plant) will then serve to compare actual and nominal value. The calcula-
tions result in a relation between average burn-up of a fuel element and
it~i~()~()Pi.<: c::()tIlJ>()~:i.~i.Qn~ Thg a-'l~J:'age bJJJ~n ...up then can either be calculated-
or measured. Its calculation needs a rather extensive amount qf informa-
tion to produce any results of reasonable accuracy. These data include
reactor power level and control rod pattern, as a function of time as
weIl as, detailed information with respect to fuel element reshuffling.
This information has to be obtained with sufficient accuracy and in a
way as to guarantee its reliability.
2 It is observed, that the fissile material is not easily accessible during
its stay in the reactor plant, but it is contained in fuel pins or fuel
elements. Therefore, safeguarding the fissile material contained in these
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pins, i.e. detecting any diversion, may very weIl be achieved
by applying the safeguards procedures to the pins themselves. This
implies, that the pins or fuel elements carry a tamperresistant iden-
tification and that their integrity can be checked. To detect any di-
version of fissile material, it will then be sufficient to verify
that each pin (or fuel element) that has been introduced into the
reactor vessel will re-appear in the hot storage area after a reasonable
period of time. This eounting procedure can be done with an error of
measurement equal to zero.
A further problem unique to reactors as opposed to fabrication and reprocessing
plants is the so-called "diversion of neutrons". This involves, firstly, the
uncontrolled introduction of fertile material into or at least close to the reac-
tor vessel and, secondly, the uncontrolled removal of the same piece of material,
after the reactor neutrons have transformed part of it to fissile material.
Fig. 1 shows schematically the "legal" route of fuel through a reactor
plant that consists of a cold storage area, the reactor bay area, and the hot
storage area. A re-introduction of partially burnt-up fuel is included. The
other 3 figures illustrate the possible routes of diversion of fuel.
Fig. 2 deals with the case that a fuel element is withdrawn from the reac-
tor without being transferred to the hot storage area. This could mean, that
a crude reprocessing of this fuel element inside the reactor bay is being per-
formed.
Fig. 3 concerns the illegal removal of spent fuel from the reactor plant
from the reactor bay or from the hot storage area. The equivalent removal of
new fuel from the cold storage area is also shown.
- _.. _-----
Fig. 4 finally illustrates illegal irradiation of fertile material, i.e.
"diversion of neutrons". This material might be als,o illegally removed from
the reactor bay area or be kept there and treated as under 2.
3.3 Particular situation for the Atucha reactor, a D20 cooled and moderated
pressurized water reactor.
The Atucha reactor scheduled to go into operation in Argentina by 1972
was selected as an actual example of a D20 cooled and moderated pressurized
water reactor. There are three points to remind that may have implications on
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the safeguards for this particular reactor or reactor type compared to others:
1 The reactor uses natural uranium as a fuel. While this still has to be
safeguarded, the incentive to divert fresh fuel of this type is rather
smalI.
2 The reactor is fuel1ed automatically on 1ine.
3 A core loading consists of about 250 fue1 elements thus making the task
of checking fuel element identifications feasib1e as far as the number is
concerned.
4. Specifications of the Atucha Reactor that are relevant for Safeguards
The Atucha reactor is a heavy water natural uranium power reactor, which is
designed by Siemens AG., West Germany and constructed near Atucha, Argentina.
It is expected to go into operation in 1972.
4.1 Plant description
Some technica1 details of this power plant are summarized in Tab1e 1.
Table 1: Technical Details of the Atucha Power Plant




Reactor power 1100 MWth
340 MlVl!l
/
Fue1 element 253 fue1 elements in the core
36 fue1 pins /e1ement
5,25 m active 1enght
11,9mm pin diameter
Fuel U02 (nat)
153 kg U /fue1 elementnat
average burn-up 7000 MWd/t
Contro1 rods number 29
material HF-23, Steel-6
Fuel element storage Capacity to store
1265 irradiated fuel elements
-~
The reactor building is shown in Figs. 5 to 8. The reactor core is located in a
double containment. The inner spherical part of the containment is of 20 mm
steel (16 in the Figs.) and the outer part is of 60 cm concrete (hemisphere) and
80 cm concrete (cylindrical part). The steel containment is accessible through
a personnel door, an emergency door and a welded door for heavy materials.
The reactor vessel is surrounded by the biological shielding (concrete), which
contains also the fuelling machine maintenance room (13 in the Figs.). The biologi-
cal shielding has a concrete roof, which can be removed so that the reactor bay
crane can reach the reactor vessel and the fuelling machinel repair room (12 in the
Figs.). This operation can only take place durin~ reactor shut dcwn.
The fuelling machine maintenance room can be separated from the reactor vessel
room by a moveable concrete curtain so that the fuel1ing machine can be maintained
during reactor operation. The maintenance room is accessible through a heavy
concrete door.
Fig. 9 shows the reactor vessel. The dimensions are indicated in this figure,
the location of fuel elements and control rods is indicated, too.
4.2 Fuel element handling
Th~ reactor is refuelled on load in normal operation. The movement of
fresh and irradiated fuel in the reactor can be seen from Fig.l0a and 10b.The freah
and irradiated fuel elements are stored outside the reactor containment
building in the fuel element storage hall. The first core loading is brought
into the reactor building through the lock for heavy materials. Routine fuelling
is carried out as follows: The fresh subassemblies are 10wered into the wet
storage pond (around J in Fig. 10a) uaing a light hoist (K in Fig. 10a). They Ire
introduced into the reactor b~ through the same transfer system ~hrough vhich the
irradiated fuel elements leave the reactor (see below). Alternatively,fresh
fuel elements can be introduced into the reactor through the personnel lock and
can be inserted into the reactor vessel during reactor shut down 'with the he1p
of the reactor bay crane (M in Fig.l0b). ror this operation, the concrete roof,
separating the crane from the reactor vessel has to be removed, which is
possib1e on1y during reactor shut down.
-10-
Irradiated fuel elements under normal conditions are removed on-load with the
help of the fuelling machine (5 in Fig. 10a and 5 in Fig. lOb). The fuelling ma-
chine is directed by remote control to the position of the fuel element to be
discharged. It is positioned over the closure of the subassembly and flooded
internally with high pressure heavy water (115 Atm.). The closure is opened
remotely with the help of a gripping tool, the fuel element is lifted out of
the reactor vessel and a new fuel element out of the fuelling machine's
magazine is introduced into the reactor. Then the closure is closed again.
The fuelling machine with the irradiated subassemblygoes to the tilting flask
(6 in Fig. 10a ud 6 in Fig. lOb), vhieh is in velrtieal position, The tilting fluk
has the following functions:
a) to take over the irradiated fue! element
b) to cool the fuel element by D20
c) to dry and to cool the fuel element by gas
d) to change to light water cooling
e) to bring the fuel element in a horizontal position
f) to introduce the fuel element into the fuel transfer tube {12 in Fig. 10a}
The fuel transfer tube brings the fuel element to the wet storage pond, where
it is erected to a vertical position and stored in racks provided for this pur-
pose.
The whole loading and unloading procedure is remotely controlled - partly by
means of control programs. The fuelling machine can be maintained during reactor
operation in the fuelling machinemaintenance room (see Fig. 10b+») vbieh ean be
separated from the reactor by concrete shielding. In this room a test position
for the fue Hing machine is located (7 in Fig. lOb). This pCl!5it~f)n., "11i«:l1 e911't.l1i:r18
a cooling loop is thought to test the functioning of the fuelling machine.
A second fuelling machine is kept ready in the fuelling machine repair room
inside the reactor building. It can be exchanged with the other fuelling
machine in case this is out of order, by means of the reactor bay crane. For
this purpose the concrete roof, separating the crane from the reactor vessel
has to be removed and thus the reactor has to he shut down.
+}the fUelling machine i8 shown in this position in Fig. lOb
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4.3 The fuel element
Fig.11 shows a fuel element of the Atucha reactor in the cooling channel.
The fuel is contained in theform of natural uranium dioxyd pellets in Zry-4 pins.
37 pins (36 fuel pins and 1 structural pin) are combined by spacers to form a
fuel element. One fuel element contains about 152 kg of natural uranium.
5. Logical Structure of a Safeguards System for the Atucha Reactor
5.1 Safeguards measures by an inspector in the reactor plant
5.1.1 Access of the inspector
During reactor operation, an inspector has access at any time to certain strate-
gic points or areas, namely
1 The fuel element storage hall
2 All places where the output of those instruments are to be read that have been
installed for safeguards purposes (s. chapter 6). It is also important to
ensure that the proper operation of the safeguards instruments can be
checked by theinspector.
Before the first reactor start-up and during operational shutdown, the inspector
has also access to the reactor building rar visual inspections of the general
lay-out of the building.
5.1.2 Use of safeguards instrumentation
Thesäfegüärds system to beproposedwiEhin Ehe rramewoik cf tllis contract
is based on an identification and counting of ele~ents. It will
be supplemented by measures suited to detect unauthorized irradiations.
The incoming fuel elements will be identified by visual inspection and
brought into the cold storage area, where they stay until transfer to the
reactor bay. While in principle, .this area could be controlled by continuous
visual inspection, in practice this will turn out to be highly impractical
cansidering the great amount of reactor plants to be operated in the near future.
Therefore, an occasional check will reveal if all elements that should be in
the storage area according to the operatoris repofts to the agency are really there
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The next logie step then is to ensure that each fuel element that leaves
the storage area towards the reaetor bay will also be introduced into the reactor
and, vice versa, that each fuel element that is withdrawn from the reactor will
soon reach the storage area. The following measures are planned for this purpose:
l Automatie recording of the identification mark of eaeh fuel element
that leaves the storage bay via the fuel elements transfer mechanism.
2 Automatie reeording to decide if an irradiated fup.l element is transported 1n
"." "t" di . .1n or ou rect10n, 1.e. towards the reactoT or towards the storage
bay.
3 Automatie recording of load lifted and distance travelled by the gripper of
the fuellingmaehine hoist,and linear distanee travelled by the loading
machine itself to ensure that loading and unloading of fuel elements will
be noticed and can be correlated to element transfers from and to the
storage bay.
Within the hot storage area the identification mark of eaeh fuel element
again can be checked by the inspeetor. Beeause the Atucha plant provides
aecomodations for five core loadings, it will be praetical that groups of irra-
diated fuel elements will be put into cages set up in the wet storage area and
will be sealed by the inspector after their identification has been checked.
This ~s done to avoid identifying the same fuel elements repeatedly.
There still remain two problems to be solved, the "diversion of neutrons"
and the removal of fuel elements by other means than using the loading maehine.
Concerning the first point, it appears to be extremely impractical to design
a deviee that automatiea11y monitors a11 goods ente ring the reactor bay area
for open or hidden fertile materiaL Tnereföre, it Seefus tö be more prom~nng
to concentrate on the removal of such material from the reactor, making use of
the aceompanying radiation. As the use of the normal loading machine would
reveal the illegal measure, one had to use some other crane, and so both problems
not covered so far concern the use of loading and de-loading devices other
than the loading maehine. These two additional measures will be taken:
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4 Installing of a distance-load recorder to the heavy cranes in
the reactor hall and the storage hall.
2 Installing of radiation survey instruments to reveal in case irradiated
fertile material 01' fuel elements are withdrawn from the reactor with-
out adequate shielding to avoid the use of the loading machine 01' other
heavy cranes. The location of these instruments has been described
in chapter 6.
\ . .
As a further measure, an lnspector of the control authorlty should by
visual inspection check ror the presence of heavy cranes and crude repro-
cessing devices, first, before starting of the plant and occasionally later
on. This inspection has to be scheduled as not to imply aplant shut-down
that is otherwise unnecessary.
5.2 Reactor Operator's Reports to the Agency
By monthly reports the reaetor operator informs the Ageney about fuel
elements.arriving at, 01' leaving the plant and internal fuel element move-
ments. Also the Ageney should be informed about the integrated reaetor
power.
Reports about the fuel element movement should eontain the exaet date
of the movement (hour, date). It should be indieated from where to where
the fuel element has been moved (fabrieation plant, eold storage, reaetor
vessel, hot storage, ete.); the identifieation number of the fuel element
should be given. These information ean be filled into a form, which is
deseribed in Tab. 1, in order to faeilitate automatie data proeessing.
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Table 1: Form for the reports of the reactor operator to the IAEA about
fuel element movement
Date of the report:15.7.69 Time: 14.00
i
from+)Hour Date Fuel element Moved Moved to+)
No.
10.30 30.6.69 137 I 1 2
I
I Ii
Example for reporting fuel element movement
+)1 =Fabrication plant
2 = Cold storage
3 ... Reactor vessel
4 = Hot storage
In a second form the location of all fuel elements of the plant has to be
indicated.
Table 2: Form for the reports of the reactor operator to the IAEA about
fuel element location
Date of the report: 15.7.69 Time: 14.00
Fuel element No. . +) Fuel element No.
. +)
Locat~on Locat~on
1 2 151 2
2 2 · ·
I 3 2 · ·
I
4 2 · ·· · · ·· · 253 2
I
· · 254 1· · · ·· · · ·· · • ·150 2 · ·
, , I
+) 1 = Cold storage
2 = Reactor vessel
3 ... Hot storage
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In a third form the integrated reactor power has to be announced to the
Agency. Tab. 3 shows an examp1e.
Tab1e 3: Form for reports of the reactor operator to the IAEA about integrated
reactor power
Date of the report: 15.7.69 Time: 14.00
Month Power produced during Hours on Une in the
the month ,-~ h7 month '-h 7- -- th -
January 818 400 744
February 712 800 672
March 818 400 744
April 659 100
1) 600 1)
May 818 400 744
June 792 000 720
l)shut down for maintenance during 5 days
The integrated reactor power will be useful for checking the corresponding
activity level over the reactor baYt for cross checking the movements of
various loading and unloading mechanisms in the fuel routest and so on.
Failure of instruments of the inspector t damaging of instruments t seals and
fuel elements should be reported to the Agency as soon as the operator gets
not-ice of them.
Routine reactor shut downs, modifications of the plant lay-out and movement
of heavy materials other than routinely done in the reactor building,should
be announced in advance.
-16-
5.3 ~gics of the Safeguards System
The safeguards system is based on a comparison between nominal and
actual inventory of fuel elements within the reactor plant.
The nominal value is given by the fuel elements that have arrived at the
reactor plant (and have been counted and identified by an inspector) 1'1:tnUS
those that have left the plant for re-processing or other reasons like further
storage (those again have been counted and identified by an inspector). The
actual inventory can be checked by direct visual inspection at any time, as
far as fuel elements in the storage areas are concerned. As a direct check
of the actual inventory of fuel elements within the reactor imposes serious
problems, this inventory has to be deduced indirectly by means of the measures
described under 5.1, i.e. mainly by photography of identification marks and
the activities of 1ng01ng and outcoming fuel elements in context with an
evaluation of the records of the sensors that moni tor the moven:ent of the
loading machine. These measures will be backed by records of loading machine
load. While these measures serve to control that all fuel elements that should
be present, really are so, the other measures mentioned under 5.1, i.e. f-r~
recording within the reactor area and, as a back-up measure, again, distance-
load and position recorders for heavy cranes, will serve to detect the pre-
sence of unauthorized fuel.
It is important to ensure that safeguarding will still be possible should
any of the major measuring devices fail. The easiest wayto overcome instrument
failure is given by duplication. Therefore, it is proposed to duplicate the
camera that takes the photographs of the identification marks. A duplication
is also recommended for the sensors that monitor the movement of the loading
machine. As far as the y-detectors are conceI'ned, more than one detectorw-il1
be provided anyhow in the transfer tube as weIl as in the reactor bay area.
Nevertheless, a duplication may be found desirable.
A duplication of the distance-load equipment, however, is not envisaged,
as this only has the character of providing back-up information.
FinallYi it may happen, that the identificaticn cf seme cf the fuel elements
runs into difficulties. This problem will be overcome by having three indepen-
dent identification marks on each fuel element.
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Furthermore, one mayaIso observe that the alternative to checking the
identity of fuel elements is given by performing either burn-up measure-
ments or calculations and connecting those with the calculated relation
between burn-up and isotopic composition for the reactors in question. The
nominal value for the absolute amount of plutonium contained in the fuel
elements that is calculated in this way is subject to an error of at least
a few percent, and the actual value to be determined later will also not
be free from error. Therefore, one may argue that even if one out of every
thirty or tourty fuel elements cannot be identified, the result is still of
the samequaiity as can be obtained by means of burn-up calculations.
One last remark may be made with respect to the use of the operator's
data in case of a failure of the safeguards instrumentation. It appears to
us, that the use of data that have been produced by means of unsafeguarded
instruments is of very little value, as an operator who intends to divert
fissile material will find a way to produce false but consistent data.
5.4 Comparison with a Previously Propo~ed System
Under the IAEA research contract Nr. 519/RB Dilworth, Secord, Meagher and
Associated Limited Consulting Engineers, Toronto-Vancouver, Canada have
developed safeguards procedures for heavy water moderated and cooled power
reactors with continuous refuelling. The safeguards system which has been
proposed is based on three measures
- Review of operating records by the inspector
- Tamperproof measurements, performed and recorded automatically
during the inspector's absence
- Spent fuel surveying (calculation and measurement)
The a~m of this safeguards system is to determine whether diversion of
fissionable material has occured from the plant, and also the quantity of
such materials held at the site. In accordance with these aims, the tamper-
proof measurements and the spent fuel surveying refer to both fuel element
movement in the plant and determination of burn-up.
The safeguards system presented in the present report aims at detection
of a diversion of fissile material more than at an exact knowledge ofthe
quantity and quality of this material at the plant. The latter is justified
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by the fact. that adetermination of the quantity of fissile material pro-
duced in a nuclear reactor can only be determined with a reasonable accuracy
(1-2 %standard deviation) by measurement J.n the accountability tank in a
reprocessing plant. This measurement will be carried out J.n any case. if
interesting amounts of fissile material are produced.
So the safeguards system proposed in the present paper avoids burn-up
calculations and measurements. The detection of a diversion of fissile
material is guaranteeQ by the proposed identification system and the instru-
mentation. The amount of fissile material detected to be withdrawn can be
estimated by the known history of the fuel element (or pin) which has dis-
appeared and the reactor power rate. known to the inspector by the operator's
reports.
It should be noted that an identification system as it has been proposed
in this paper is restricted to reactors with a relatively small number of
fuel elements « 1000).
6. Detailed Description of Safeguards Measures and Instruments
6.1 Fuel Element Identification
The identification marks may either be attached to eye~ fuel pin or just
to every fuel element. In the latter case a sealing procedure has to render
it forbiddingly difficult to remove or to exchange a fuel pin in a manner as
not to leave any damage to aseal.
6 · 1 +).1.1 SealJ.ng of the Atucha Fue Element
Each fu~l pin carries a screw threäd at öne end pJ.ece. This end will pass
through an opening in the fuel element support plate (see Fig. 11). As the
diameter of the end piece J.5 slightly smaller than the diameter of the pin.
a lock nut will serve to fix the fuel pin within the support plate. This lock
nut has a short cylindrical sleeve attached to it that will be squeezed together
around the roof shaped end of the fuel pin to lock it against accidental loosen-
ing. (If a pJ.n is removed on purpose, the sleeve part of the lock nut has to be
+)The sealing methods described in {-2_7. {-3_7 seem not to be applicable
to the sealing of fuel elements.
{-2_7 C. Sastre, The Use of Seals as a Safeguards Tool. BNL 13480.March 1969
{-3_7 G.C. Fulner, Tamper Indicating Safeguards System. RL-REA-2228
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pressed open aga~n and it will be possible to design the lock nut in a
way as to prevent it from being used twice. As applies to all seals of
this type, however, this will serve as a tarnperresistant measure only in case
there are no spare lock nuts available to the reactor operator. This then
would require for locklnuts that carry a certain tamperresistant identitication.)
Six of the peripheral fuel pins are not fixed by lock nuts but carry
a zirconium tube each.These six tubes provide the connection between the
fuel element proper and its coupling piece.
The sealing of the fuel element will be achieved by means of a guard
plate (see X in Fig. 11) that is weJ-ded to the six tubes just mentioned.
The plate will be close enough to the lock nuts and can be shaped in a
way as to prevent the use of a wrench that ~s necessary to fix a fuel pin
that has been exchanged with another one. The problem of sealing the fuel
p~ns within the fuel element can then be reduced to the inspection of
a welding seam. This asks for an investigation of the problem: How can a
welding seam be fingerprinted?
6.1.2 Identification of the Atucha Fuel Element
While it is desirable to have an identification mark that can be read
easily and is also tamperresistant,lit appears to bel more practical tO split
up this twofold requirement, into two single ones: to have one mark that
can be easily read (e.g. a number) and another one that is tamperresistant.
The automatie camera would primarilY serve to register the first mark,
while an inspector may check the correspondence of the two marks for all
fuel elements that are in the storage bay or for part of them on occasion
of a routinemspection visite As the welding seams have to be made tamper-
resistant anyhow, to check the integrity of the sealing, it appears practical
to use them as tamperresistant identification marks also. In case it turns out,
that the photographie registration of a welding seam (that has been made
to lock somewhat"individuallytr on purpose or that has been fingerprinted ~n
one way or other is sufficiently tamperresistant, the camera will be able to
provide the information for the contrcl cf both the registration marks with
one shot. For a quick check, an inspector may satisfY himself by checking the
number cf the elements, while for a more careful check (to be done later,
if practical) he may check some or all of the welding seams. The non-tamper-
resistant numbers will be attached three-fold around the periphery of the
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support plate. In this manner, one of them will be seen by the camera, re-
gardless of the accidental azimuthal position of the element when it leaves
or enters the transfer tube. As there are six welding seams per fuel element,
at least two of them will appear on each photograph.
6.1.3 Identification of Individual Fuel pins
For the sake of completeness, it shall be noted that an identification
of fuel pins is possible at the lower end of the pins (i.e. opposite to the
end that carries the thread for the lock nut). The end caps are flat and
provide a circular area of 8 mm diameter for the attachment or for the en-




In routine operation fuel elements enter and leave the reactor through
the fuel element transfer tube. For their automatie identifieation an
under water operating eamera will be installed as indieated in Fig. 10a.
The head of a fuel element entering or leaving the reaetor will be photo-
graphed. The outside end of the fuel element transfer tube has to be con-
structed so that the support plate of the fuel element, carrying the iden-
tifieation mark is visible for the camera. Attention has to be paid to the
faet that the eamera should take photographs only in its nominal position
indicated in Fig. 10a. This can be aehieved for example by sealing the eamera
in its position or by monitoring its movement in a suitable way. The eamera
is aeeessible to the inspeetor at any time.
For reasons of reaetor operation sueh eameras have already been installed
for the surveying of fuel elements. A periscope equipped wi th a eamera ean
also be considered.
In addition, two radiation monitors (A and B in Fig. 10a) indicate the
direetion of motion of an irradiated fuel element. These monitors are mounted
in the fuel element transfer tube, which is aeeessible during reactor operation
from the annular space between the reactor building and the storage hall~
A direct inspection of the identJfication mark of the fuel elements stored
in the storage pond is possible with the help of a neriscope (J in Fig. 10a).
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6.2.2 Recorders for the Movement of the Fuelling Machine and Heavy Cranes
The fuel element movements inside the reactor hall are recorded by
two different equipments:
By means of a set of three sensors t fixed in the positions Dt E and F
~n Fig. lObt the movement of the fuelling machine from
the tilter position either to the reactor vessel or to the test pos~­
tion is recorded. These sensors can be checked by an inspector during
reactor operation from outside the concrete roof of the reactor room.
These relatively simple devices should be layed out as tamperresistant
as possible.
b) ~i~~~~~:!2~~_r~~2r~~r~
Distance-load recorders are routine equipment in many reactors. For
safeguards purposes their records are used as redundant information
to complement the information obtained by the sensors.
The same equipment - fixed tamperresistant position indicators and
distance-load recorders - has to be installed for the main cranes
in the reactor building and the storage hall (K t Lt M and N in Fig. lOa
and lOb). In order to avoid exess information t these devices are re-
corded on printers only when the cranes carry loads greater than a
minimum weight - for example 4 to.
6.2.3 Radiation Monitors
For the detection of unauthorized movements of irradiated fuel elements
without shielding t gamma radiation monitors (Pt Q and R in Fig. lOa and
lOb) are mounted in different positions in the reactor building and the
storage hall. The location of these monitors has to be choosen in such a
way that they cannot be masked by shielding walls.
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7. Description of an Inspection Visit
In this section all measures to be taken by an inspector during a routine
inspection visit to the reactor will be describedo (The measures to be taken
during a non-routine inspection will depend on the event, which has caused
the visit, so that no general recommendations can be given.)
Before the inspector goes to the reactor plant, he determines the nominal
inventory of the cold and hot storage and the reactor vessel from the plant
operator's reports. These inventory lis~contain the fuel element identifica-
tion marks and the corresponding sealing marks, so that the inspector can check
the identity and integrity of each fuel elemento
7.1 Inspection of the Hot and Cold storage Area
The actual fuel element inventory of the hot and cold storage area can be
verified directly. The fuel elements in the cold storage can be checked visually
and their identification and sealing marks be compared directly to the nominal
marks in the inspectors lists. In order to avoid repeated checks of the same
fuel element in subsequent inspection visits, the sealing of fuel elements,
which are stored for a longer time period, in cages may be very helpful.
The inventory of the hot storage is verified by testing the seals of the
cages with burnt up fuel elements, identified during former inspection visits
and by identifying fuel elements, discharged in the meantime with the help
of the periscope. The latter operation is very important because in this way
the identity and integrity can be made sure ~n a tamperresistant manner. (The
integrity of a fuel element is not checked by the automatie instrumentation).
After a tho!,ough check of their identity and integrity these fuel elements
will be transfered into a cage which will be sealed. The integrity of the
cages has also to be tested by visual inspection and with the help of the
periscope.
A direct verification of the fuel element inventory of the reactor vessel
~s not possible. So the activity of the inspector is directed to verify the
operator's reports about fuel element movements by means of the tamperresistant
instrumentation 0
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This verification will not take place at the site, because of the equipment
needed for data preparation and data evaluation (development of films etc.).
This work will be carried out in the inspection center, where the equipment,
computers, etc. will be available.
All plans, where the printouts of the instrumentation are stored and
sealed, areaccessible during reactor operation. The camera (Fig. lOa) is
located in the fuel element storage hall, so that its film can be taken
without difficulty. The printout of the two radiation monitors ln the fuel
element transfer tube (A and B in Fig. lOa) are accessible from the annular
space between reactor and storage building. The signals of the tamperresistant
sensors and the distance load recorders - so far as they have been installed
on the inspector's demand - can on principle be transferred to the fuel element
storage hall. But for the reason of tamperresistance long conduction wires
should be avoided. So it is recommended to print out these informations at the
place,where the instruments have been installed. In picking up the print outs
the inspector can so check at the same time the integrity of his seals and
of the total instrumentation. The proper inspection procedures, to be carried
out by the inspector have been presented in table 4.
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Table 4: Inspector's Activities during a Routine Visit
Activity Instrument Location
-----------------------+-----------+------------1
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Indirect verification of the
reactor vessel fuel element
inventory (and sealing):
a) COllecting information for the

















Roof of the reactor
room
0) Collecting information about
non-declared movements
Distance load Reactor hall
recorders+




The collected data are evaluated and analysed by the inspector after his
return from the inspection visit. For the data evaluation t automatie data
processing is recommended. In case of contradictions of the operator's
reports and the results of the tamperresistant measurements, investigations
have to be started in a second action level.
(~c. Cost Implications
The costs of sealing and marking the fuel elements are anticipated to be
close to negligible (under the assumption that the welding seams can be
used for identification).
Costs will arise, however, through the necessity to install the following
equipment, that is not needed for normal operation:
1. Under-water camera and associated equipment to controlcamera
action.
2. Radiation counters plus associated equipment for monitoring the
transfer tube and the reactor bay area.
3. Distance-Ioad recording equipment for those cranes that would not
routinally be equipped with such, i.e. the service cranes in the
reactor building and in the storage area.
4. Sensors to monitor'the movement of the loading machine.
5. Tamperproof installation of the equipment mentioned under 1 to 4.
The total costs for this additional instrumentation are not expected to exceed
~ 1.1 - 1. 3 • 105• They are low compared to the shutdown costs /day of about
4
($ 5.5' 10 for the Atucha type reactor.
9. General Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Work
The method proposed in this report, i.e. safeguarding of fuel elements,
depends onthe ability to fingerprint the welding seams attached to the
guard plate of the fuel element. Therefore, highest priority should be
g1ven to a feasibility study concerning this problem. One should keep in
mind, that the problem of checking the fingerp!int in a reasonably con-
venient manner 18 of equal importance. It is highly desirable to do this
check by means of the picture taken by the under-water camera that is pro-
vided anyhow.
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Furthermore, an actual field test of the equipment proposed is recommended.
Tbis refers in particular to the reading of identification marks of fuel
elements that have been ln a reactor, to the photographie registration of
these marks during fuel element transfer into and out of the reactor and
to the re1iabi1ity and sensitivity of the radiation monitors and position
sensors.
Tbe testing time 1S estimated to be 18 months with the total costs not
exceeding ~ 1.5" 105•
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"Diversion of Neutrons" in a Reactor
Fig.4
1 Reactor pressure vessel
2 Steam generator
3 Hain coolant pumps
4 Pressurizer
5 Control rod drive
6 Fuelling machine
7 Tilting flask
8 Fuel transfer tube
9 Moderator cooler
10 HZO supp1y
11 Storage bay for separation tubes
12 Fuel1ing machine repair room
13, Fuelling machine maintenanceroom
14 Va1ve room - Moderator circuit
15 Reactor bay crane
16 Steel shell
17 Secondary shie1ding
18 Pressurizer. blow off-tank
20 Service alley
21 Safety fuel pump
22 Pipe ducts
23 Cable ducts
24 D20 storage tanks
25 Ion exchangers
26 Filters
27 Storage bay coolant circuit
28 Oil supply for main coolant pumps
29 D20 drain
30 Container for fuel element transport
31 Fue1 element lifting tool
32 Gantry

































Horizontal Cut Through Reactor Building at Level -15,20 m.
-9-e-o
For meaning of numbers see Fig. 5.
Fig. 7
Vertical Cut Through Reactor Building and Fuel Element Storage B~





Vertical Cut Through Reactor Building












2 Fuelling machine maintenrHJCe room
3MOIClble shielding door
" Rotating shielding door
5Fuelli"J machine
6Tilter
7 Fue//ing machine test position
8 Seat -on.seal exchGnge position
9 Station for exchange of endclosure plugs
70Ca/andda tube pit




75 Spent fuel storage racks





2 Recirto de ~ninietto de Ia maquina de I'f!CDmbio
3 Puerfa blildada mOvil
"Puerta blindaoo giratoria
5 Maquina de recambio
6Basculante
7 Posicit5n de prueba de la maquina
8 posici6n de recarnbio de/. sellode asiento
9 EstacIOn de intercombio de cabezales Clel canMtible
10Ctimara de almacenaje de tubos de ca/~ja_
17 Sala de mOitaje de la maquina
72Tubo de transferencia del combustible
13Basculam extera
"Puente de maniobra
15Mareo de a/macenaje de e.c.
16Puerta del edificio de piletas
17 EstaciOn decortaminadora
18Recipiente para e.c. quemados







7 Lademaschinen - Prüfpasifion







15Lagergestel/e für verbrauc/'te BE
16Beckenhauseinfahrt
17Dekontstation
18Transportbehälter für verbrauchte BE
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7 Lademaschinen - Prüfposition
1 Reactor vauit
2 Fuelling machiM maintenance room
3 Mo vable shkldittg door
I, Rotating shielding door
5 Fuelling machiM
50 Shif!lded tube for emergtNlcy withdrowat
6 TiItH
7 Fuetling machine test position
1Rednfo deI reaCiar
2 Recinto de manttNlimitlrrlo tk lD m6quina detecombia
3 Puerta blindado miM;
I, Puerto blindado girataria
SM6quinc de recarnbio
50 RecipiMte blindado para emergencias
6 Basculante
7 PosiciOn de pruebade ta m6quina
J
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Principal Layout of Fuel
Element
removable
joint
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tube
separation fuel pin
tube
